On Objections to Nicaea II
Part II of "Icons and Saints": The Declaration, the Objections and Responses
Christ is risen!
Introduction
The Seventh Ecumenical Council defined Christian teaching on veneration and of Icons. Protestant/Evangelical objections, especially those raised by Dr. Gavin Ortlund, often stem from misunderstandings of what the Council taught, what theological problems it resolved, and how it was received, understood and interpreted.
This article provides a brief explanation of the 7th Council’s conclusion and final decree/dogma, by addressing increasingly common objections.
The Dogmatic Definition (called the Horos):
In Richard Price’s translation of the Council’s decree (Pages 563–565), we find the following excerpt of the Horos:
“The image of our Lord and God and Saviour Jesus Christ, of our immaculate Lady, the holy Theotokos, of the honourable angels and all the saints are to be set up in churches, houses, and streets. For by so much more frequently as they are seen in artistic representation, by so much more readily are men lifted up to the memory of their prototypes and to a longing after them; and to these should be given greeting and honourable veneration— not indeed the true worship which pertains to the divine nature alone. For the honour paid to the image passes over to the prototype…”
This is the foundation of the Orthodox theology of icons.
This article can easily repeat what the Council says. Still, the fear is that it would be no different than reading the entirety of the Horos. This article will demonstrate the Council’s position by addressing several objections.
These objections and worries are frequently raised by Protestants today, mainly following the videos made by Dr. Gavin Ortlund.
In this article, we will use his objections because his videos frequently cause recurring misunderstandings.
Objections and Answers
Objection 1
“Veneration is worship.”
Dr. Ortlund does not say “Veneration is worship” verbatim. What he repeatedly argues is that the actions performed during the veneration of icons (prostrating, kissing, etc.) function exclusively as acts of worship. He makes this argument thoroughly in his video titled “Is Icon Veneration a Big Deal? What Most People Miss” (this is where we will get most of his objections).
The first part of his argument is that, because Nicaea II teaches “The honor paid to the image passes to the prototype,” actions like bowing or kissing an icon become acts of religious mediation and, therefore, are “worship-like.” Let us define “mediate”:
“Mediate: to be a means of conveying; to form a connecting link between two things.” - Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “mediate,”
That is it. Nothing about worship or divinity is intrinsic to the Word itself. A mediator is something or someone that connects two parties without becoming either of them. There are many types of mediation, but his argument assumes that if something mediates anything related to religion, then it must mediate worship. This premise is simply and obviously false. Scripture mediates God’s Word – but we do not worship Scripture. Preaching mediates the Gospel – but we do not worship the preacher. The sacraments mediate divine life – but we do not worship sacraments, it is the same logic for icons. The honor given to Christ through preaching does not end in the words but terminates at Christ.
Now, let us anticipate a reply following his video’s logic, “But the Act Is Directed Toward a Heavenly Being…”
Yes, and it still does not make it worship. One can ask someone to pray to God for another or even bow to a king because of the office he holds. However, it is not the direction of the act that defines its category but the mode of the act. Worship involves sacrifice and the acknowledgment of a divine nature, not merely remembrance, honor, love, etc. Those are very different acts in different categories.
Let us use an everyday analogy, suppose one were to kiss a photograph of their late mother (who is in heaven). Are they worshiping the photo paper? Are they mistaking the photo for her? Are they offering some kind of sacrifice? No. They are expressing their love through an image (icon) that’s directed at a person. The image mediates their love without worship. Icons (which means image) operate with this same logic but are elevated by the Incarnation.
Another mistake Dr. Ortlund makes is that he reads later metaphorical language, such as “Windows to Heaven,” back into the Council, then proceeds to critique the Council for it. That is textbook anachronism, not honest historical analysis. This phrase is not found in the Horos and is later devotional language.
Objection 2
“No Biblical distinction prior to the 7th century”
This is a serious error to claim that Scripture never makes a distinction between bowing that is idolatry and bowing as veneration. So, to him it must follow that all bowing to creatures is condemned, and the distinction is a late invention.
This fails under Biblical evidence; let us look at the verses that condemn bowing only when it is explicitly worship. The emphasis is added.
“You shall not make for yourself a carved image—any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; you shall not bow down to them nor serve them. For I, the Lord your God, am a jealous God…” – Exodus 20:5
“…And take heed, lest you lift your eyes to heaven, and when you see the sun, the moon, and the stars, all the host of heaven, you feel driven to worship them and serve them, which the Lord your God has given to all the peoples under the whole heaven as a heritage.” - Deuteronomy 4:19
“…who has gone and served other gods and worshiped them, either the sun or moon or any of the host of heaven, which I have not commanded…” - Deuteronomy 17:3
The condemnation is never just, “You shall not bow down.” However, it is always, “You shall not bow down and serve.” The Hebrew verb “to serve” in this form and context denotes sacrificial devotion and cultic service (see Blue Letter Bible, https://www.blueletterbible.org/lexicon/h5647/kjv/wlc/0-1/)
So that is one category of bowing that is condemned; now here is the one that’s not: Bowing as honor. Here are some verses that show the same bodily action of bowing (hishtachavah in Hebrew, proskynesis in Greek) being used constantly for non-worship purposes.
“So they told the king, saying, “Here is Nathan the prophet.” And when he came in before the king, he bowed down before the king with his face to the ground.” - 1 Kings 1:23
“Then Abraham stood up and bowed himself to the people of the land, the sons of Heth.” - Genesis 23:7
In all these verses above we see the same verb with the same physical act with no sense of condemnation or confusion with worship. The objection assumes that if Scripture condemns bowing in the context of idolatry, then all bowing in any religious context outside of bowing to directly to God (how ever that would be done without a kind of “icon”) must be idolatrous. This is a non sequitur (it does not follow), the Council does not invent a new category here, but formulates and names one that has existed for thousands of years. Just like in the case of the Trinity, the hypostatic union, or any other words created to put a name on doctrines, naming does not equal inventing.
Objection 3
“Remembrance is not veneration.”
He starts this objection by making a false dichotomy, “Art vs Icons”. He draws a sharp line that art is for remembrance, which is acceptable, and Icons for veneration, which, to him, is illegitimate. His idea is that looking at something is remembering, but an accompanying physical act, like bowing or kissing, is a cultic escalation.
This is flawed because he assumed that remembrance is purely cognitive and that a physical response is merely an unnecessary add-on, but Scripture does not support this. When Scripture commands to “remember the sabbath” or “remember the covenant,” is the command to think about it? Or do these commands entail embodied actions? So, for Nicaea II to say that remembrance equals embodied action is not a later development or corruption but is purely Biblical logic.
He continues by saying that the defenders of icons wrongfully appeal to catacombs, early Christian art, and commemorative imagery to justify veneration. He believes this confuses categories because, again, to him, painting something to remember it does not equal veneration. However, the appeal to early art does not mean that early Christians physically venerated icons exactly as we do today; that would be a straw man. The appeal is much more basic: Christianity was never iconophobic. So the conversation goes: if images were not seen as intrinsically idolatrous, the question is how images may be used rightly. This is the question that Nicaea II answers.
The core issue in his arguments is his confusion about the definition of “Icon”. He argues that an “icon” per Nicaea II is not just art; honor “passes through” to the prototype, and therefore it is no longer remembrance but is now in the territory of worship. He assumes that “passing through” changes the act’s category, but, ironically, the principle of the prototype actually prevents idolatry.
“Passing through” means the act does not terminate at the object; the image is not the recipient, and the act is relational, not material. This in actuality, is the opposite of idolatry.
Nicaea II did not say that one must venerate all images, that all religious art are icons proper, or that just mental remembrance is sufficient. However, it said that the images (Icons) of Christ and the saints may be honored because the Incarnation sanctifies that form of visibility and that bodily honor completes real remembrance.
Objection 4
“The apostles never kissed icons.”
Ortlund argues that Nicaea II’s claim that “kissing icons” goes back to the apostles is “manifestly wrong”. He repeatedly says that Nicaea II claims the Apostles kissed icons, but the Council never made such a claim. This misconception comes from the acclamations that say, “This is the faith of the apostles… we kiss the holy images…”. This is confessional language, not a historical assertion about specific physical actions in the first century. He is refuting an argument or claim that the Council does not make.
He continues by making an admittedly rhetorically powerful but logically weak argument. If the apostles had literally kissed icons, the fathers of the 4th and 5th centuries would have mentioned it, but this is a classic argument from silence. This stems from a commonly overlooked point about how the language of theology evolves. This is as far as Holy Orthodoxy goes with “development of doctrine”.
In reality, where there is no controversy, there is no need for precision, and where there is no precision, there would not be technical language. Without that technical language, later clarifications appear to be a newly invented doctrine. However, this pattern of controversy → precision → technical language is how doctrines like the Trinity, hypostatic union, the canon of Scripture, and others all developed. So, in another irony, the silence prior to the controversy proves nothing more than that there was no controversy on the issue.
The fatal flaw in this logic of equating “not yet articulated” with “not apostolic” is that the same standard would disqualify the Nicene term “homoousios”, the Chalcedonian definition, and the New Testament canon. The Council’s claim is not “The Apostles did this exact action or practice,” but rather “This practice follows necessarily from what the apostles taught.” This is how every ecumenical Council works.
Objection 5
“The anathemas make icons a salvation issue.”
Dr. Ortlund’s argument here is serious. The language of Nicaea II is indeed severe; the aim here is not to soften the language. The question is not whether the Council used strong language or not, but what that strong language means within the Church’s theological and juridical framework. We will go into this topic more deeply at a later time, but for now, below is a brief explanation.
Let us start by explaining what “Anathema” means and what it does not mean. Dr. Ortlund is correct that the Council says:
“An anathema is nothing other than separation from God.”
That language is real and should not be dismissed as trivial, but here is the crucial point: we must understand the context. The above statement is not part of the Horos (i.e., the dogmatic definition); it occurs after it is written, approved, and signed. This is explicit in Richard Price’s translation of the Acts. Acclamations are liturgical, responsive, and public expressions of allegiance and rejection, etc. They are not analytical definitions or new dogmatic statements. The phrase “Separation from God” in conciliar language is not meant to be a definitive judgment on any individual’s eternal destiny.
In patristic and conciliar usage, anathemas are used to declare a rupture of ecclesial unity and to separate one from the life of the Church. It is medicinal and ecclesial, not eschatological and final; it is meant to be a call of repentance, sort of a “wakeup call” so to speak. This is why the Church prays for their repentance, the fact that anathemas can be lifted, and that reconciliation is always possible. If anathema meant that one is “damned forever,” then repentance would be meaningless.
In context, as well as with the other councils, “Separation from God” means cut off from the life of the Church. They function as ecclesial “lines in the sand” against the iconoclast doctrine of the current crisis rather than as individual final verdicts on eternal salvation.
This was brief, but the topic of anathemas and salvation outside of the Church deserves its own article. However, in short, what the Council is saying is that to knowingly reject the doctrine, and or accuse those who accept it of idolatry, is to separate oneself from the Church. The Council declares ecclesial separation, and while deadly serious, only God alone judges souls.
Conclusion
The Seventh Ecumenical Council was not convened for religious art or to impose salvific ritual requirements. It was convened to defend the reality of the Incarnation of Christ. At its core, the issue was whether the Word of God who became flesh could be depicted, remembered, and honored without idolatry.
When read on its own terms, Nicaea II does not teach that icons are worship or that they function as a condition of salvation. It teaches that because God has truly become visible in Jesus Christ, matter itself can serve as a means of remembrance. The distinction between worship and honor, and what makes an action idolatry or veneration, is not a later invention but is biblical and early patristic grammar clarified in the context of controversy.
Though they are not the Gospel, icons serve as reminders of it. They are the Church’s visual confession that the Word was seen, touched, and made known, and finally, because of that, creation itself is called to bear witness.